47年中当中国情形不佳，马氏主持军方与国务院会议，军方认为大毛子控制土共二毛子，
国务院亲共的则不信。马氏不做决定，派魏德迈将军去中国查看实情。魏德迈批评国府
仍主支持国府剿共，但他又重提不可能五国托管东北的事。因为米苏在韩国托管就不行，
更不可能托管东北。马氏要魏切掉五国托管的内容，然后把报告公开出来，让国会讨论。
魏氏拒绝，马氏不公布，这样援助国府的事就拖下来。
With crisis overtaking the Nationalists, Secretary of State Marshall in Washington received two extremely conflicting recommendations, one from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other from the State Department.
The Joint Chiefs began with a questionable premise and jumped to an extreme conclusion. "It is clearly Soviet policy to expand control and influence wherever possible," the chiefs announced. In Manchuria the chiefs cited spurious "evidence" to prove that the Russians planned to achieve imme人iate control.17 The JCS said they believed "that the Chinese Communists, as all others, are Moscow-inspired," and "should be regarded as tools of Soviet policy."18 It was therefore "imperative that the United States take positive action to prevent" Communist victory in the Chinese civil war by providing massive assistance to the Nationalists. In summary, the Joint Chiefs saw the Chinese civil war wholly as a Soviet effort and not an indigenous political and social conflict.19
John Carter Vincent, director of Far Eastern affairs, led the State Department attack against the Joint Chiefs' aggressive policy.20 On June 20, Vincent wrote Secretary Marshall that substantial military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek "would lead inevitably to direct intervention in China's civil war." It also would provoke the Soviet Union to a similar intervention and would be inconclusive "unless we were prepared to take over direction of Chinese military operations and administration and remain in China for an indefinite period." Vincent said he didn't consider Soviet control of China to be a great danger.21
Vincent recommended that the U.S. supply the Nationalists with needed ammunition but attract as little attention as possible and not supply vastly increased military aid. Undersecretary Dean Acheson concurred.22
The Joint Chiefs of Staff listed what they considered to be evidence that Soviet intentions were to remove Manchuria from the Chinese economy and integrate it into the economy of eastern Siberia:
1) their "obvious efforts and success" in preventing reestablishment of active Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria;
2) robbing Manchurian industrial equipment and shipping it to Siberia in 1945 and early 1946;
3) the Sino-Soviet treaties of 1945, which, "as a result of Soviet pressure on China," gave the Soviets control of Manchuria's "only efficient system of communications and important trade outlets";
4) the "systematic encirclement" of Manchuria through Soviet positions in northern Korea, Port Arthur and Mongolia and "through encouragement given Communist forces in Manchuria itself."
None of these is "evidence" of Soviet aggressive intentions in Manchuria, however. Reasons are as follows:
item1) the Chinese Communists, not the Russians, were preventing Nationalist control of Manchuria and where the Reds were in possession there was no Soviet presence whatsoever;
item 2) Soviet removal of Manchurian industrial equipment to Siberia proves rather that the Russians entertained no plans for control of Manchuria and instead robbed it while they were temporarily in possession;
item 3) the United States and Britain at the Yalta conference approved Soviet control of the Manchurian railways, Port Arthur and Dairen in exchange for Soviet entry into the war against Japan;
item 4) the U.S. and Britain also approved "independence" of Outer Mongolia and Soviet occupation of north Korea at Yalta and there was no evidence of Soviet encouragement of Red forces in Manchuria.
Indeed, to counter unsubstantiated claims of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Reds, which the American consul general had already refuted on April 17, 1947, Arthur R. Ringwalt, chief of Chinese affairs in the State Department, produced a summary on July 3 which showed there was no evidence of Soviet aid to the Chinese Reds. Ringwalt's report found no Soviet equipment captured; no evidence of Soviet military material support; no Russian-speaking Chinese officer; all explosives, ammunition and other supply boxes labeled in Chinese; no noticeable quantities of Soviet artillery or heavy weapons (but much presence of American equipment captured from the Nationalists). See FRUS, China, 1947, pp. 99, 148, 174, 207-08, 214-5, 838-9.
48年，斯矮子封锁西柏林，如杜二放弃西柏林，那杜二一定落选。杜二就极力反击，
中国战事就无人注意了，斯矮子给林匪军备顾问发动临门一脚攻势，毛猴子就上位了。
The hate campaign against all things Communist reached fever pitch on June 24, 1948, when the Soviet Union imposed the Berlin blockade on American, British and French zones in the former German capital. The reason was Soviet anger over the decision of the Western Allies to unite their German occupation zones into a single economic unit. From this rose a Western-oriented West Germany and a Soviet-oriented East Germany. The Western Allies fought the Berlin land blockade by using guaranteed air corridors to fly in food and supplies. The Russians abandoned the land blockade on May 12, 1949, but the Western Allies kept flying in supplies until September. The Berlin blockade, more than anything else, confirmed in the minds of Americans that Communism was embarked on aggressive expansion throughout the world. The blockade also focused American attention on Europe and diverted interest from China. This reduced chances that a strong movement would arise to rescue Chiang Kai-shek but Americans nevertheless swept the Chinese Reds into the same category with Soviet Communists and did not seriously consider the possibility that they were fundamentally different.
The United States thus watched its old friend in China waste away but offered no hand to his successor.
还有的原因杜二投机指望毛猴子是铁托2.0。最后还想用台湾来拉毛猴子出来。结果
毛猴子被斯太阳家法圈禁两个月，韩战打醒了杜二。
韩战保了自由中国台湾70年，此次乌战可让自由中国回到大陆，开第三共和。
https://www.bevinalexander.com/china/34-us-cuts-losses.htm
国务院亲共的则不信。马氏不做决定，派魏德迈将军去中国查看实情。魏德迈批评国府
仍主支持国府剿共，但他又重提不可能五国托管东北的事。因为米苏在韩国托管就不行，
更不可能托管东北。马氏要魏切掉五国托管的内容，然后把报告公开出来，让国会讨论。
魏氏拒绝，马氏不公布，这样援助国府的事就拖下来。
With crisis overtaking the Nationalists, Secretary of State Marshall in Washington received two extremely conflicting recommendations, one from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other from the State Department.
The Joint Chiefs began with a questionable premise and jumped to an extreme conclusion. "It is clearly Soviet policy to expand control and influence wherever possible," the chiefs announced. In Manchuria the chiefs cited spurious "evidence" to prove that the Russians planned to achieve imme人iate control.17 The JCS said they believed "that the Chinese Communists, as all others, are Moscow-inspired," and "should be regarded as tools of Soviet policy."18 It was therefore "imperative that the United States take positive action to prevent" Communist victory in the Chinese civil war by providing massive assistance to the Nationalists. In summary, the Joint Chiefs saw the Chinese civil war wholly as a Soviet effort and not an indigenous political and social conflict.19
John Carter Vincent, director of Far Eastern affairs, led the State Department attack against the Joint Chiefs' aggressive policy.20 On June 20, Vincent wrote Secretary Marshall that substantial military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek "would lead inevitably to direct intervention in China's civil war." It also would provoke the Soviet Union to a similar intervention and would be inconclusive "unless we were prepared to take over direction of Chinese military operations and administration and remain in China for an indefinite period." Vincent said he didn't consider Soviet control of China to be a great danger.21
Vincent recommended that the U.S. supply the Nationalists with needed ammunition but attract as little attention as possible and not supply vastly increased military aid. Undersecretary Dean Acheson concurred.22
The Joint Chiefs of Staff listed what they considered to be evidence that Soviet intentions were to remove Manchuria from the Chinese economy and integrate it into the economy of eastern Siberia:
1) their "obvious efforts and success" in preventing reestablishment of active Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria;
2) robbing Manchurian industrial equipment and shipping it to Siberia in 1945 and early 1946;
3) the Sino-Soviet treaties of 1945, which, "as a result of Soviet pressure on China," gave the Soviets control of Manchuria's "only efficient system of communications and important trade outlets";
4) the "systematic encirclement" of Manchuria through Soviet positions in northern Korea, Port Arthur and Mongolia and "through encouragement given Communist forces in Manchuria itself."
None of these is "evidence" of Soviet aggressive intentions in Manchuria, however. Reasons are as follows:
item1) the Chinese Communists, not the Russians, were preventing Nationalist control of Manchuria and where the Reds were in possession there was no Soviet presence whatsoever;
item 2) Soviet removal of Manchurian industrial equipment to Siberia proves rather that the Russians entertained no plans for control of Manchuria and instead robbed it while they were temporarily in possession;
item 3) the United States and Britain at the Yalta conference approved Soviet control of the Manchurian railways, Port Arthur and Dairen in exchange for Soviet entry into the war against Japan;
item 4) the U.S. and Britain also approved "independence" of Outer Mongolia and Soviet occupation of north Korea at Yalta and there was no evidence of Soviet encouragement of Red forces in Manchuria.
Indeed, to counter unsubstantiated claims of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Reds, which the American consul general had already refuted on April 17, 1947, Arthur R. Ringwalt, chief of Chinese affairs in the State Department, produced a summary on July 3 which showed there was no evidence of Soviet aid to the Chinese Reds. Ringwalt's report found no Soviet equipment captured; no evidence of Soviet military material support; no Russian-speaking Chinese officer; all explosives, ammunition and other supply boxes labeled in Chinese; no noticeable quantities of Soviet artillery or heavy weapons (but much presence of American equipment captured from the Nationalists). See FRUS, China, 1947, pp. 99, 148, 174, 207-08, 214-5, 838-9.
48年，斯矮子封锁西柏林，如杜二放弃西柏林，那杜二一定落选。杜二就极力反击，
中国战事就无人注意了，斯矮子给林匪军备顾问发动临门一脚攻势，毛猴子就上位了。
The hate campaign against all things Communist reached fever pitch on June 24, 1948, when the Soviet Union imposed the Berlin blockade on American, British and French zones in the former German capital. The reason was Soviet anger over the decision of the Western Allies to unite their German occupation zones into a single economic unit. From this rose a Western-oriented West Germany and a Soviet-oriented East Germany. The Western Allies fought the Berlin land blockade by using guaranteed air corridors to fly in food and supplies. The Russians abandoned the land blockade on May 12, 1949, but the Western Allies kept flying in supplies until September. The Berlin blockade, more than anything else, confirmed in the minds of Americans that Communism was embarked on aggressive expansion throughout the world. The blockade also focused American attention on Europe and diverted interest from China. This reduced chances that a strong movement would arise to rescue Chiang Kai-shek but Americans nevertheless swept the Chinese Reds into the same category with Soviet Communists and did not seriously consider the possibility that they were fundamentally different.
The United States thus watched its old friend in China waste away but offered no hand to his successor.
还有的原因杜二投机指望毛猴子是铁托2.0。最后还想用台湾来拉毛猴子出来。结果
毛猴子被斯太阳家法圈禁两个月，韩战打醒了杜二。
韩战保了自由中国台湾70年，此次乌战可让自由中国回到大陆，开第三共和。
https://www.bevinalexander.com/china/34-us-cuts-losses.htm
